We present a comprehensive model of household economic decision covering both fully cooperative and non-cooperative cases as well as semi-cooperative cases, varying with income distribution and a parameter vector θ representing degrees of individual autonomy with respect to the public goods. In this model, the concept of "household θ-equilibrium" is introduced through the reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium for Nashimplementation and its extension to semi-cooperation. Existence is proved and some generic properties derived. An example is given to illustrate. Finally, a particular decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is derived and the testability of the various models discussed. Мы представляем весьма общую модель принятия экономических решений в домохозяйствах, включая полностью кооперативные и некооперативные случаи, а также полукооперативные случаи, основанные на изменениях распределения доходов и вектора-параметра θ общественных благ. В этой модели понятие θ-равновесия домохозяйства вводится через переформулировку равновесия Линдалла для модели имплементации по Нэшу и еe обобщения на полукооперативный случай. Доказана теорема о существовании и изучены свойства соответствующих равновесий. Дан иллюстративный пример. Наконец, получена специальная декомпозиция псевдоматрицы Слуцкого и обсуждены возможности верификации различных моделей.
Introduction
Most economic models of household behavior, both theoretical and empirical, have assumed that households act cooperatively, implying that binding marriage agreements under full information and perfect communication are feasible at no (or low) transaction costs. This cooperative approach includes the traditional, but empirically contested, "unitary models" viewing the household as a single decision unit, e.g. Samuelson's consensus model and Becker's altruist model. It also includes models based on axiomatic bargaining theory, as well as the more recent "collective" models, exploring the restrictions on observable household behavior implied by the assumption of Pareto e¢ ciency without explicitly referring to some decision making process (Chiappori, 1988 , 1992 , Browning and Chiappori, 1998 ).
However, some theoretical models have formalised the possibility for a household agreement to be non-cooperative and in particular to be an equilibrium in a game of voluntary contributions to public goods. In these models (e.g. Ulph, 1988, Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, Chen and Woolley, 2001) , the noncooperative equilibrium is introduced as the threat (or disagreement) point of a bargaining model 1 and, under some conditions, as a "separate spheres" equilibrium where each spouse is responsible for a distinct set of goods and services within the household, the partition being "de…ned in terms of traditional gender roles and gender roles expectations" (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, p.1007 ). 2 When binding agreements are impossible or too costly to enforce, the non-cooperative agreement may even become the acceptable default option in a continuing relationship. In this context, the concept of noncooperative equilibrium for the household has been further analysed by Preston (2005, 2011) and by Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010) who con…rm previous results by 1 This is di¤erent from earlier models where the disagreement point was taken to be divorce (Manser and Brown, 1980, and McElroy and Horney, 1981) . 2 Indeed, "specialization in the provision of such goods reduces the need for complex patterns of coordination, and traditional gender roles serve as a focal point for tacit division of responsibilities" (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, p.993) .
showing that there are generically only two possible types of noncooperative equilibria, "separate spheres" and "separate spheres up to one public good", the latter meaning that spouses do not contribute jointly to more than one public good.
Such a conclusion, though, seems to be too clearcut to give account of the variety of household arrangements. In reality, the de…nition, and hence the division, of tasks and responsibilities to provide some goods and services within the household is ambiguous and may vary over husband-wife pairs. "Child care"
or "housekeeping" might be divided in many sub-tasks that can be di¤erently shared. The perfect partition according to gender roles is a limit case that does not hold for most households in most contemporary societies. Also, arrangements within the household might change along life path (with the number of children, the income level, the geographical location, etc.). Good intentions erode with time and a genuine cooperative agreement might gradually evolve towards some more traditional division of responsibilities. The way in which the household organizes its …nances, in particular whether each spouse has its own account and/or shares some joint account, as well as the type of marriage contract may in ‡uence this evolution. 3 As emphasized by Lechene and Preston (2005) : "neither the assumption of fully e¢ cient cooperation nor of complete absence of collaboration is likely to be an entirely accurate description of typical household spending behaviour and analysis of such extreme cases can be seen as a …rst step towards understanding of a more adequate model" (p. 19).
Our objective is to follow this route and develop a comprehensive model, that includes the cooperative and the noncooperative cases at the extremes, but allows for a continuum of intermediate "semi-cooperative" cases. This comprehensive model is based on a "mechanism design" reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium for Nash-implementation (see Hurwicz, 1979, and Walker, 1981) and its extension to semi-cooperation. In order to implement the household collective objectives while preserving budgetary autonomy and feasibility, the proposed mechanism (formulated for simplicity in terms of a two-person household) is de…ned by non-manipulable personalized pricing rules for the public goods and by individual budget constraints preserving some autonomy to each spouse. Given this mechanism, the spouses choose strategically their individual contributions to the various public goods as well as their desired consumption of all goods. The solution of this game will be called a household (noncooperative)
equilibrium.
In addition, testable (local) restrictions of household demand will be investigated, such as those studied under the assumption of e¢ ciency by Browning and Chiappori (1998) , relying on the decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix as the sum of a matrix with the Slutsky properties and a "deviation matrix" (of rank equal to 1 for a two-person household). Lechene and Preston (2011) derive a similar test for the fully non-cooperative model showing that the deviation matrix has generally a larger rank than in the collective model, increasing with the number of public goods. Our paper gives a derivation of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix allowing to separate di¤erent kinds of e¤ects, each e¤ect increasing the maximum possible rank of the deviation matrix. The implementation of such tests becomes more and more demanding in terms of the required number of goods. As we will see, however, the non-cooperative and the semi-cooperative models are distinguishable as soon as there is joint contribution to more than one public good.
In Section 2, we present a two-person household semi-cooperative decision model, de…ning the non-manipulable mechanism as well as two related approaches to the concept of "household equilibrium" characterized, either endogenously or exogenously, by the degrees of autonomy of each spouse for each public good. We illustrate via an example the implications of varying the degrees of autonomy. In Section 3, we examine the generic local properties of the household equilibrium and derive the pseudo-Slutsky matrix of the household demand, then discussing the testability of the various models. We conclude in Section 4.
The household decision model
We study a two-adult household, consuming goods that are recognized by both spouses as being either private or public (within the household). Denote by A (the wife) and B (the husband) the two household members, and let q A ; q B 2 R 2n + be the vector of consumption by the two members of the n private goods and Q 2 R 
Also assumed is an agreed upon mechanism which determines the game played by the household when deciding on its total consumption given the vector of private good prices p 2 R n ++ and the vector of public good prices P 2 R m ++ . The …rst private good, assumed to be desired in any household environment, is taken as numéraire (p 1 = 1).
The Lindahl mechanism for cooperative household decisions
We start from the concept of Lindahl equilibrium, which is the best-known "decentralized" allocation mechanism 4 to allocate e¢ ciently the cost of public goods within a group. The Lindahl scheme consists in supposing that there exists a pair of personalized (Lindahl) prices P A ; P B 2 R 2m + , satisfying P A + P B = P , which are posted within the household. However, the version we give of the concept is not the standard one. It is a "mechanism design" version à la Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981). We suppose that there is enough cooperation so that the two spouses can agree on some mechanism to share the expenses for …nancing the public goods on the basis of voluntary contributions g 
Given this mechanism a game is de…ned where the payo¤s are the spouses'utility functions. The strategies of each spouse J are the quantities q J ; g
, denoting respectively the quantities of private goods, the voluntary contributions and the desired aggregate quantities for the various public goods.
For each spouse J, these strategies have to respect two constraints. First there is a budget constraint on the spouse's expenses on private goods (at the market prices p) and on public goods (at the personalized prices P J ). Second there is a feasibility constraint, whereby the desired quantities Q J should be equal to the aggregate contributions g
A Lindahl equilibrium for the household is then de…ned as the following Nash equilibrium of the game de…ned by the personalized pricing rules b
Observe that the Lindahl prices are taken as given by each spouse J because of the Nash assumption of taking as given the equilibrium strategies of spouse
B at equilibrium, implying P k , for J = A; B and any public good k.
This property (which implies that P share of the household expenditure on each public good k (i.e. the share resulting from the personalized pricing rule of the accepted mechanism), it should in addition preserve the individual autonomy for the partner (who can always go and buy g J k in the market). 6 Of course, as for the Lindahl equilibrium, the equality of the "desired" quantities of public goods to aggregate contributions have to hold for both spouses only at equilibrium.
The non-cooperative equilibrium of the corresponding modi…ed game, called a household equilibrium, still based on the personalized pricing rules b
can be de…ned as follows: 
and
This modi…cation of the mechanism has considerable consequences. First, as will be shown in the following, there is now a continuum of household equilibria (that can be meaningfully parameterized), as opposed to the generic …niteness of the Lindahl equilibria. Second, it will follow that the set of equilibria includes the Lindahl equilibria at one extreme (the only e¢ cient ones) and, at the other extreme, the noncooperative equilibria of the "game with voluntary contributions In this game, each spouse J chooses a strategy q J ; g J 2 R n+m + (q J denoting J 0 s private consumptions and g J his/her contributions to public goods) in order to solve the programme:
n+m + the wanted inequalities for the private goods and, for any public good k and P k , the other collective, valued at the personalized price P J k . This suggests an alternative approach to the household game.
The game with given degrees of autonomy
In our analysis, up to now, the degrees of autonomy of both spouses are …xed endogenously, ex post, as characteristics of a speci…c equilibrium. We may however invert the approach, and take the parameters as preliminarily and conventionally …xed, ex ante, within the household. Otherwise, we keep the same mechanism, with the same strategies and the same payo¤s. This leads to the following de…- In this concept, the division in two parts of the expenses of each spouse on each public good is made explicit through the budget constraint, according to the pre-established degrees of autonomy for that public good. The following proposition clari…es the relationship between the two concepts of household equilibrium and of household -equilibrium. 
An example
In order to discuss the conditions leading to the regimes of separate spheres and of joint contribution to one or more public goods, we shall refer to the example used by Browning, Chiappori & Lechene (2010) in the context of full non-cooperation. In this example, the spouses have Cobb-Douglas preferences over one private and two public goods. We denote by x and z the private consumptions of spouses A and B, respectively, and by X and Z the quantities of the two public goods. The utility functions are given by:
with positive parameter values a, , b and . The wife A is supposed to care more about the …rst public good, and the husband B about the second, so that
where the term on the LHS can be taken as the degree of symmetry of the spouses'preferences for the two public goods. We use the normalization
with an income distribution given by Y A = and Y B = 1 . The degrees of autonomy are assumed to be symmetric with respect to the two public goods, so that they will be simply denoted A and B .
Browning 
Using the equilibrium budget equations
we easily obtain the solution
This solution is constrained by the two …rst order conditions on the noncontributed goods, expressed as inequalities:
Clearly, one of these two conditions will be violated for small enough or large enough values of , so that separate spheres with both spouses contributing to public consumption can prevail only if the income distribution between the two spouses is not too unequal. Also, by multiplying both sides of the …rst inequality by the corresponding sides of the second, we obtain 0 < s < A B
1.
Hence, existence of this regime requires a relatively high average degree of autonomy of the two spouses, the higher the larger the degree of symmetry of their preferences for the two public goods. The fully non-cooperative case, where A B = 1, always satis…es this condition, provided there is no full symmetry in the spouses'preferences.
Now consider the regime of joint contribution to both public goods, which is generically excluded under full autonomy of the two spouses. By …rst order conditions, the marginal willingnesses-to-pay for the public goods are:
Division of both sides of the second and third equations by the corresponding sides of the …rst and fourth, respectively, leads to
the two inequalities being easily checked to be true (by taking the extreme values P A X = 1 and P A Z = 0). We thus obtain
an existence condition just opposite to the one we found for separate spheres. For both spouses to contribute to both public goods their average degree of autonomy must be small enough, the smaller the more asymmetric their preferences for the public goods.
Thus, for not too unequal income distributions, separate spheres appear as a characteristic of high individual autonomy in household decisions. As the spouses become less and less autonomous, the regime prevailing when their incomes are not too di¤erent is rather the one where both contribute to both public goods, which is the rule under full cooperation. 
Local analysis of household -equilibria
We shall now successively examine the local properties of the system of equations characterizing a household -equilibrium (extending the analysis in Browning,
Chiappori and Lechene, 2010), and the local properties of the associated household demand function (extending the analysis in Browning and Chiappori, 1998, and Lechene and Preston, 2010). 
Local determinacy
Hence, there is an excess of the number of equations over the number of unknowns equal to m 2, so that there is generically over determinacy if m > 2, or even if m = 2, since the household consumption is entirely determined in this case by the sole …rst 7 We are assuming for simplicity that all the n private goods are consumed by both spouses at the equilibrium we refer to.
order conditions, independently of any budget constraint. Determinacy thus implies either m = 0 or m = 1: there is at most one public good for which the autonomy of the two spouses is full which is jointly contributed. If there is full autonomy with respect to public good k, which is jointly contributed, we may ignore the decomposition of Q k into g 
Foundations of the spouses'demand functions
In order to pursue our local analysis, let us establish, for exogenous degrees of autonomy, the foundations of the spouses'demand functions to be aggregated into the household demand function. The Marshallian demand function of spouse k . We shall limit our local analysis to an open set R 
A . Proof. See Appendix.
The two matrices

Empirical testing
The upper bound imposed upon the rank of the deviation matrix can be used to test the di¤erent models of household behavior. Browning and Chiappori we see that n > m + 2 3m AB + 2 is needed to discriminate between full and partial autonomy. 9 Moreover, as soon as there is joint contribution to more than one public good, 10 the non-cooperative model is generically excluded, and full cooperation is still rejected at a rank of T larger than 4, leaving the possibility of semi-cooperation.
Conclusion
Our purpose in this paper has been to develop models of the household that do not impose collective e¢ ciency, an assumption often contradicted by empirical evidence, 11 and that do not limit non-cooperation to the pure voluntary contributions model, the consequences of which seem to be rather special (separate spheres or separate spheres up to one public good). However collective e¢ ciency and pure non-cooperative behavior are not excluded but included as particular models in a more comprehensive approach trying to give account of the large variety of formal and informal contractual arrangements and decision procedures that are used by households all over the world. The concept of household equilibrium is meant to be ‡exible by allowing the household members to adopt various degrees of autonomy, either determined endogenously as characteristics of a speci…c equilibrium among many others, or taken as parameters preliminarily and conventionally …xed within the household and re ‡ecting some selection
process.
An important issue that is raised by these results is the identi…cation of a good consumed by the household as being private or public (or semi-public).
As we have seen, this is crucial for the testability of the various models. 12 The public or private nature of a good is of course linked to some objective characterictics, like the possibility of being non-exclusively consumed or the presence of external e¤ects, but also linked to the recognition of such characteristics by the spouses themselves and their agreement to share the good. Another unsolved related issue is the …xing of the autonomy parameters. The techniques used by the New Empirical Industrial Organization when estimating conduct parameters could possibly be adapted. 13 Further work is obviously required. is observationally equivalent to non-cooperation. We …rst show that = 0.
For any h and h 0 , the generic element of
namely
kh 0 , is equal to zero under separate spheres, since 
